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Physical displacement, relocation and resettlement are widely acknowledged as posing enormous social
risk. For over four decades, scholars, campaigners and project-affected people have sought to highlight
the effects of development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR). Increasingly, the generic set
of international standards that are used to manage cases of DIDR are being tested by the unique chal-
lenges posed by mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR). In this article the authors
provide a critical appraisal of current thinking and practice relating to MIDR. Findings indicate that MIDR
is largely characterised by factors that occur in 'brownﬁeld' project scenarios; even when the initial
displacement commences in otherwise 'new' mining developments. The article identiﬁes ﬁve critical and
distinguishing factors associated with MIDR. These factors are explored in light of contemporary policy
debates surrounding the mining industry, including 'consent', 'negotiated agreements' and overall
effectiveness of existing social safeguards in regulating industry practice.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).1. Introduction
Physical displacement, relocation and resettlement are widely
acknowledged as posing enormous risks to project-affected peo-
ples. For over four decades, scholars, campaigners and project-
affected people have sought to highlight the effects of
development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR).1,2
During this time, there has been a proliferation of case studies,
research and academic literature showcasing the different di-
mensions of this highly problematic and contested practice. Ad-
vancements in deﬁning minimum standards for developers around
consultation, planning, compensation, grievance handling and
livelihood restoration have since occurred, spearheaded by Theen), d.kemp@smi.uq.edu.au
hydro-power projects, agri-
r infrastructure.
nd resettlement’ (DFDR) is
science literature. We recog-
, but use the more established
ence or presence of volunta-
ly concerned with the social
sion, physical relocation, and
Ltd. This is an open access articleWorld Bank Group's social safeguards for involuntary resettle-
ment.3 Many international ﬁnance institutions (IFIs) and other or-
ganisations have aligned with these standards, which are now the
global reference point for DIDR.4
In this article we do not present a review of the DIDR literature.
This is a well-established area of inquiry. We acknowledge the
contribution of DIDR scholarship, in particular the work of Thayer
Scudder (2005, 2000; 1993), Michael Cernea (2000, 1999; 1997;
1995), Hari Mohan Mathur (2013, 2008; 1998) and Theodore
Downing (2009; 2002a) as providing foundations for the
continued evolution and reﬁnement of international standards and
safeguards. Our focus is mining-induced displacement and reset-
tlement (MIDR). We argue that the dominance of DIDR as a singular3 This evolution in global standards includes: World Bank Safeguard Policy 4.12
on Involuntary Resettlement (2001), African Development Bank Safeguard Policy on
Involuntary Resettlement (2003), International Finance Corporation Performance
Standard 5 on Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement (2006), Inter-
American Development Bank Environment and Social Standards Involuntary
Resettlement Policy (2006), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Policy and Performance Requirements on Land Acquisition, Involuntary Resettle-
ment and Economic Displacement (2008), Asian Development Bank Safeguard
Policy Statement on Involuntary Resettlement (2009). For a succinct description of
the evolution and emergence of these standards, see Price (2009).
4 Equator Principle banks, for example, use the IFC Performance Standards as
their reference point on resettlement and other issues of social and project risk.
under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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MIDR can be understood and accounted for. This limitation has
pronounced and detrimental effects on contemporary resettlement
practice in the global mining industry. Unless an industry-speciﬁc
debate emerges, knowledge building on MIDR will remain gener-
alised, diluted and unfocused.5
The current deﬁcit in MIDR knowledge is two-fold. The ﬁrst issue
stems from what can be characterised as a ‘disconnection’ between
DIDR literature and MIDR practice. DIDR scholars have undoubtedly
proven displacement to be one of the most disruptive and per-
plexing of development dilemmas. Theodore Downing was the ﬁrst
to observe that the “rich vein of knowledge” from this established
literature has barely been tapped by the mining industry. In his now
decade old report Avoiding New Poverty: Mining Induced Displace-
ment and Resettlement, Downing (2002b, p.6) aptly characterises
drivers for the increased signiﬁcance of MIDR e rich mineral de-
posits being found in areas with relatively low land acquisition costs
in areas of high population with poor deﬁnitions of land tenure and
politically weak and powerless populations. According to Downing
(2002b, p.8), “no global survey has assessed the scale of MIDR”
despite evidence suggesting signiﬁcant numbers of mine displaced
persons globally. The persistence of these knowledge gaps is a major
barrier to improvements in MIDR policy and practice.
The second issue relates to the absence of dedicated mining
scholarshipwithin the DIDR literature. Downing's observation about
the lack of industry-wide data on the scale and impact of MIDR is an
ongoingbarrier for the sector.Within theDIDR literature,manyof the
unique features ofMIDR remain unexamined. Themost prominent is
the effect of project lifecycles on the planning and implementationof
MIDRevents.Miningprojects are designed tomove throughaproject
cycle: from exploration, project design and planning and construc-
tion, to operations and closure. Each phase of development and the
transition between them, introduces a range of separate challenges
for land use and resettlement planning (Sonter et al., 2014a).
Furthermore,unlikeother sectors,MIDRcanoccuratanystagewithin
this lifecycle. In addition to lifecycle aspects, mining projects are
directly tied to international commoditymarkets. Thevolatilityof the
market has an immediate effect on how companies plan (or fail to
plan) their MIDR activities. Against ongoing debates about the social
dimensions ofminingand theprevalence ofMIDRglobally there is an
urgent need to better understand the effects ofMIDR and the speciﬁc
risks it poses to affected persons, governments, project developers,
shareholders and lenders.
In this article our objective is to demonstrate the unique factors
associated with MIDR. We argue that because of these factors,
greater attention ought to be paid to MIDR as a distinct albeit
related area of DIDR research and practice. The article is presented
in six sections. Section one explains the data sources and meth-
odology. Section two locates MIDR within contemporary debates
about mining and social responsibility. Section three provides a
summary account of the current state of knowledge relating to
MIDR. In section four we deﬁne ﬁve characteristic features that are
unique to MIDR. Before concluding, section ﬁve provides a critical
discussion with implications for researchers, industry practitioners
and policy makers.6 Secondary data are drawn from 58 resettlement ‘events’. From this initial list of
events 17 events were excluded due to basic information being incomplete, unclear
or unavailable.
7 Mining projects are commonly referred to as ‘greenﬁelds’ or ‘brownﬁelds’ to
describe the extent to which exploration or industrial activities have previously
been conducted in the project area. Metaphorically, greenﬁelds suggests untouched2. Data and methods
The data for this article is drawn from a combination of primary
and secondary data. Primary data was collected by the authors5 This also includes maintaining a distinction within the extractive industries. We
concur with Terminski (2013) on the need to distinguish displacement in mining
from displacement in the oil and gas sectors.between 2007 and 2014 during resettlement-related ﬁeldwork
assignments undertaken across nine mine sites. Our engagement
for these assignments is best described as professional research
consultancies. Assignments ranged from short one-off studies with
limited post-ﬁeld work engagement, to repeated site-based
engagement over several years. Three sites involved one ﬁeld
visit with less than twelve months of engagement. For the
remaining six sites, two or more ﬁeld visits were undertaken. For
two of these sites the engagement has extended over seven years
with greater than ten ﬁeld visits between the two authors.With the
exception of one assignment (Kemp et al., 2013), data collection and
reporting on resettlement was undertaken on a conﬁdential basis.
For this reason, data are aggregated and some cases referred to
anonymously.
Secondary data was obtained from a selection of publically
available sources including RAPs, company sustainability reports,
websites and annual plans. Newspaper articles were also used. A
small number of conﬁdential RAPs were also reviewed. In total 17
RAPs were examined, 13 of which are available in the public
domain, 4 are internal company documents. The sample is biased
towards larger projects which are either required to disclose
planning documentation or which have attracted enough consis-
tent external attention to allow the authors to develop a brief
proﬁle of the resettlement event. Many of these projects are
operated by mid-tier companies. In terms of coverage, the sample
does not include resettlement events involving smaller-scale pro-
jects and operators. Table 1 summarises the data sources and
methods used for this article.
The ﬁnal sample includes 41 resettlement events at 33 sites.6 In
terms of categorization, we separated mining ‘projects’ where
resettlements occurred from the resettlement ‘events’ that took
place in these locations. For example, at Newmont's Ahafo project
in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana, multiple resettlement action
plans (RAPs) have been developed and implemented to accom-
modate the progressive expansion of the mine. In this case we have
recorded Ahafo as the ‘site’ and the resettlements for Amoma (in
February 2009), Subika (in October 2009) and Ahafo South (in
August 2005) as separate ‘events’. Representing these resettlement
cases as a single site-based event would fail to identify the effects of
project lifecycle, ownership, legacy, or in fact any other signiﬁcant
historical data on each of the individual resettlement phenomenon.
The prevalence of multiple and ‘brownﬁeld’ resettlement events in
MIDR introduces a unique and dynamic condition that is not
adequately represented in the DIDR literature.7
Of the available public sources of information on MIDR events,
RAPs are generally the most comprehensive. When prepared by
specialists to align with international standards, RAPs contain sum-
mary details of the project history, socio-economic conditions, ex-
pected scope and severity of impact, along with proposed measures
and resources to mitigate the effects of displacement. The document
should reﬂect company efforts to accurately characterise the social
impacts associated with the development, together with an articu-
lation of how the project will respond to these impacts. Given itsgrass and brownﬁelds land that has been trampled and converted to industrial use.
The industry itself is inconsistent in its application of these terms. We refer to
brownﬁelds events within this article to emphasise the point that resettlement is
often undertaken (i) during the operational phase and/or (ii) at sites characterised
by the industry as ‘greenﬁelds’, but where a mining legacy already exists.
Table 1
Summary of data sources and methods.
Data type Source Methods
Primary Nine (9) physical sites with resettlement
communities across Ghana, Lao PDR,
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon
Islands, Mongolia and Peru
In-depth interviews





Secondary 4 Privately available RAPs
13 Publically available RAPs





Total sample size: 33 sites, 41 resettlement events.
Table 2
Resettlement projects by lifecycle and region.
Lifecycle Africa Asia Paciﬁc Central Asia Latin America % Total
Study phase e 0 e 2 5%
Construction 5 11 1 4 51%
Operation 7 8 e 3 44%
Total 12 19 1 9 100%
Table 3
Resettlement by commodity and region.
Commodity Africa Asia Paciﬁc Central Asia Latin America Total
Coal 1 2 e 2 5
Copper e 1 1 5 7
Copper/gold e 3 e e 3
Gold 8 10 e 2 20
Iron Ore 2 1 e e 3
Mineral sands 1 e e e 1
Platinum 1 e e e 1
Polymetallic e 1 e e 1
Total 14 19 1 10 41
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provide important information on individual resettlement events.
A major limitation of using RAPs as historical records, however,
is that RAPs are a declaration of future intent. The documents do
not record how many people were displaced, or how, nor do they
record the ﬁnal quantum of monies spent in effecting the reset-
tlement. RAPs do not capture the reactions of stakeholders,
including company personnel, to the mine's efforts and intentions.
Moreover, few resettlement projects release studies either as
background to the RAP or as evidence of exercising due diligence.
Overall the practice of making RAPs publically available is rare, and
where RAPs are released for public consumption, it is often to
satisfy lender requirements, rather than to build or support
knowledge in this area.8 Similarly, external assessments of MIDR
are difﬁcult to obtain, evenwhen projects are undertaken according
to international standards.
The difﬁculty in securing consistent sources of complete infor-
mation necessarily curbs the ability of the sector to generate a
global picture of MIDR and its effects. Using the sources of data
available, we developed an MIDR database to enable comparisons
of resettlement events based on location, corporate ownership,
commodity, type of displacement, lifecycle phase, number of
households affected, cost, application of standards, and level of
disclosure.9 Tables 2 and 3 below provide an overview of the study
sample by region, lifecycle and commodity.
3. Global debates in mining and relevance to MIDR
In the past two decades, the mining industry has become deeply
engaged in a number of complex and contentious social policy
debates, including ‘business and human rights’, ‘free prior and
informed consent’ (FPIC), ‘revenue transparency’, ‘conﬂict min-
erals’, ‘equitable distribution of development’, and ‘negotiated
agreements’. The industry's peak bodies have developed collective
policy positions and guidance materials that clarify the relevance of
these debates to the industry context.10 For resettlement, the8 In terms of assurance, RAPs are one document in a continuum of risk-mitigation
mechanisms. According to international standards of practice, one would expect to
ﬁnd internal and external monitoring and evaluation reports undertaken at regular
intervals. External audits ought to provide status reports on how the project has
actually performed against the plan outlined in the RAP.
9 Here, the ‘lifecycle phase’ refers to the period that the resettlement was
scheduled to commence. A complicating factor, as we discuss elsewhere, is that the
implementation of resettlement events can straddle multiple stages within the
overall project lifecycle.
10 In support of its Sustainable Development Framework, the International
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) has developed position papers on: Part-
nerships for Development; Transparency of Mineral Revenues; and Indigenous
Peoples. Guidance tools provide coverage across: community development; human
rights; community health and artisanal mining. Information on these and other
topics are available at: http://www.icmm.com/.industry has yet to develop a position representing its approach.11
Instead, the pattern appears to involve industry endorsement of
internationally-agreed DIDR standards and individual companies
engaging in private debate with consultants, lenders and regulators
about planning, implementation and compliance issues on a
case-by-case basis.12
Resettlement also appears isolated from emerging topics and
policy debates that have captured the industry's attention. This is
best observed in relation to the topic of agreement-making. The
industry increasingly positions negotiated agreements as a frame-
work for recognising rights, building mutual understanding,
entering into good faith negotiation, and building relationships
(Brereton et al., 2011). In contrast, RAPs are positioned as a planning
device, and apply a generic framework rather than one that is
tailored to a speciﬁc context or set of relationships. RAPs do contain
negotiated elements, such as agreed amounts for land or crop
compensation, housing standards and infrastructure upgrades, but
RAPs are not regarded as a ‘negotiated agreement’. Contemporary
international standards and safeguards essentially encourage de-
velopers to formulate a management plan, rather than an agree-
ment with impacted stakeholders. In the scholarly literature,
resettlements are conceived of as either ‘forced’ or ‘managed’, rather
than ‘negotiated’ or ‘agreed’.13 Agreements have been used in select
circumstances to deﬁne elements of resettlement programs and can
inﬂuence how issues are represented in the RAP (Bainton, 2010).
However, the extent to which different stakeholders recognise the
resettlement or program elements as either ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ is
not disclosed as part of the RAP documentation.
In terms of the literature, MIDR can be categorised into three
basic types: academic, publically available sponsored studies, and
privately commissioned and held reports. The vast majority of11 The explanatory points under the ICMM's Sustainable Development Principle 3
state that member companies must “minimise involuntary resettlement and
compensate fairly for adverse effects on the community where they cannot be
avoided”. The Principle does not address livelihood restoration, beneﬁt sharing or
development.
12 In mining, endorsement of international standards and safeguards is largely via
the IFC's (2012) Environmental and Social Performance Standard 5 on Land
Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement.
13 An exception is PNG, where there is no constitutional basis for compulsory land
acquisition, and conversion of use is determined by a negotiating process (Filer,
2000).
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is occasionally peer reviewed, but because it is mostly commercial-
in-conﬁdence, it is difﬁcult to determine how effective or inﬂuen-
tial this material is in shaping planning processes and practice
outcomes. Based on our engagement with the sector, almost every
major company has commissioned recognised expert consultants
to assist in the formulation of corporate strategies, standards, and
project-speciﬁc MIDR work. The results of this work are not always
shared internally. The structural, cultural and communicative pat-
terns that exist between corporate ofﬁces and remote operations
habitually exclude these studies from the institutional memory
bank.
The majority of academic case studies on MIDR are located
within the DIDR literature. This ensures that scholars reach a
broader audience of development practitioners, but runs the risk of
generalising resettlement dynamics in mining contexts. Terminski
(2013), for example, positions MIDR as a distinct sub-category of
DIDR by cataloguing the most “spectacular or social inﬂammatory”
cases from the sector. Bennett and MacDowell (2012) present oral
testimonies about cumulative economic and physical displacement
from coal mining in India. Their account documents profound im-
pacts on culture, land and livelihoods among mine-affected com-
munities, but unfortunately, the study is buried in an edited volume
on DIDR. Elsewhere, Madebwe et al. (2011) highlight the plight of
mine-affected people in Zimbabwe, with a similar case study un-
dertaken by Buzoianu and Toc (2013) in Romania.14 Consistent with
the generalist DIDR literature, both studies describe a causal rela-
tionship between poor resettlement planning and the legacy of
impoverishment. MIDR cases also appear within social impact-
orientated mining literature where reference to DIDR literature is
scant. It is not clear whether the DIDR literature is considered
irrelevant by authors or has been inadvertently overlooked. The
specialist mining literature mirrors the pattern observed in the
policy domain whereby MIDR is positioned as an ‘issue example’
not the main concern. For instance, resettlement is presented as a
complicating factor in artisanal mining (Hilson et al., 2007), human
rights (Farrell et al., 2012), psycho-social impacts (Goessling, 2010),
land use contestations (Delang et al., 2012) and approaches to crop
compensation (Abuya, 2013).
A small number of authors bridge the specialist mining and
DIDR literature. In these works, MIDR is also used as an illustrative
mechanism for reﬂecting on other sets of development dilemmas.
Fernandes (2007) presents the results of a country-wide study in
India and socio-economic impacts of MIDR.15 He focuses on the
perspectives of minority and marginalised groups rather than
characterising MIDR as a distinct phenomenon within this
context. Lahiri-Dutt’s research (2014; Ahmad and Lahiri-dutt,
2006; Herbert and Lahiri-dutt, 2004) focuses on MIDR in small
and large-scale mining across Asia and the Paciﬁc region. Across
this body of work, her primary concern is the gendered nature of
mining. She argues that gender-blind policy privileges the in-
terests of powerful men to the detriment of diverse types of
women, their families, and mine-affected communities. Likewise,
Szablowski‘s research has (2002) focused on the effects of policy
on mining and displacement. Using the Antamina copper mine in
the Peruvian Andes as a case study, he offers a critical examination
of the World Bank's Involuntary Resettlement Policy. The study
provides a valuable historical account of the legitimizing pro-
cesses of global policy and the shaping of corporate conduct.14 See also Alexandrescus' (2011) study on family-level impacts at the proposed
Rosa Montana mine in Romania.
15 For additional sources on coal mining in India see Padel and Das (2007) and
Mathur (2008).While all of these studies are in their own right valuable to the
debate on MIDR, more work is required to deﬁne the ﬁeld of in-
quiry and to understand those elements that differentiate MIDR
from other types of DIDR.
4. Differentiating MIDR
One factor differentiating MIDR from other forms of DIDR is that
resettlement can occur in any stage of the project cycle. In mining,
project planning and investment decisions are governed by
external factors, such as commodity prices, shareholder expecta-
tions, project ﬁnancing requirements, in addition to legislative re-
quirements and regulatory standards at different project phases
(Van Zyl, 2005). While regulators may inﬂuence the social safe-
guards that a developer will adhere to, the volatility in commodity
markets can lead to rapid changes to a project's mine development
plan. This, in turn, can result in an unexpected demand for land by
the project with pressure on all parties to manage acquisition and
displacement. Depending on when the demand for land emerges,
displacement can occur during exploration, project design and
planning, construction, or operations, the latter of which occurs
through incremental project expansion. In addition to the effects of
market volatility, we observe that single displacement events can
straddle different phases of a project's development. For instance, a
resettlement may be planned during feasibility and physical relo-
cation may be undertaken at construction, with livelihood pro-
gramming the responsibility of operations. In practical terms, this
means that different teams with different knowledge, skill sets and
engagement with the project become involved in the management
of a single resettlement event. Where MIDR events span multiple
project phases, research suggests heightened levels of social and
enterprise risk around local economic dependency (Filer, 2000),
human rights impact (Terminski, 2012; Farrell et al., 2012) and
community conﬂict (Franks et al., 2014).
Furthermore, projects that are being described by industry as
‘greenﬁeld’ from a project perspective could be understood as
having brownﬁeld characteristics when viewed from a resettle-
ment perspective. The La Granja project in Peru, for example, was
ﬁrst privatised in 1994 when Cambior, a Canadian company, ac-
quired the property for detailed exploration. The company pre-
pared a feasibility study and an environmental impact assessment,
followed by a program of land acquisition and physical relocation.
In 2000 Cambior sold its exploration rights to South African Billiton
Base metals, which later merged with Australian multinational,
BHP. After determining that the project was unviable, BHP Billiton
returned the property to the Peruvian government in 2002. As part
of its closure program, the company instituted a land buy-back
scheme to former landowners. In 2005, Rio Tinto won a bid is-
sued by the Peruvian Government to continue the exploration and
development of the concession. From the outset, the company
decided to lease rather than to acquire land for exploration. As
activities proceeded, the construction of minor infrastructure
impacted the primary homes of 21 families. The impact mitigation
for these families is what Rio Tinto refers to as a ‘partial’ resettle-
ment. The arrangement involves families receiving lease payments,
assistance to re-build dwellings in another location, and compen-
sation for the cost of relocation. This represents a third mining-
induced relocation for some families.16 For a developer looking to
take La Granja into production, the permanent resettlement of
these and other families would be required. In the paragraphs that16 That is, families initially displaced by Cambior, who then returned to the project
site after purchasing their land back from BHP Billiton, and who were subsequently
resettled ‘partially’ by Rio Tinto.
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MIDR.4.1. Incremental expansion and uncertainty
Unlike other industries, mining companies face high levels of
uncertainty around their land requirements. Banks (2013) suggests
that this is a response to improved geological knowledge as oper-
ations proceed, ﬂuctuations in commodity prices, and the avail-
ability of new technologies. Imprecise prediction of land
requirements also appears as a function of cost deferral within the
mine lifecycle. Several interviewees indicated that cost deferral was
exacerbated during the tenure of particular mine managers
incentivised to limit capital cost and operating expenditure. Under
brownﬁeld scenarios, land is secured on an ‘as needed’ basis rather
than as a ‘front end’ activity. According to Downing (2014, p.8) there
is a unique tendency in mining to move human settlements on a
piecemeal basis, a strategy he refers to as “stepwise mining
expansion and land take”.17 In mining, this renders displacement a
distinctly incremental phenomenon. Almost half (44 per cent) of
the operations listed in Table 2 resettled communities during the
operational phase. This does not account for resettlements that
were planned during feasibility, commenced during construction
phase and were then serviced or completed during operations.
Under our deﬁnition, the ‘brownﬁeld effect’ can also occur when
the spectre of resettlement hangs over a community while a project
is put on hold. Newmont's Akyem mine in the Birim North District
of the Eastern Region of Ghana was suspended several times over a
period of seven years before receiving Board approval in 2011.
During this time, Newmont maintained a strong project presence,
undertaking consultation and engagement about the status of the
project, even when its future was unclear. While information was
readily provided, this does not diminish the fact that certain
households were earmarked for resettlement, only for the project
to stall. From a community perspective, the process of resettlement
had commenced. A similar dynamic can occur while ownership of a
project is in transition. In 2011, global mining giant Rio Tinto ac-
quired Australian company Riversdale and its Benga coal mine in
the Tete province of Mozambique during a partially complete
relocation process. Rio Tinto revised the resettlement process after
acquisition in order to address shortcomings in livelihood resto-
ration of already relocated households. The relocation of a
remaining group was delayed while other issues were addressed,
creating uncertainty and tension between relocated and remaining
families, and the company (HRW, 2013). The project has since been
acquired by Indian joint venture company International Coal Ven-
tures Private Limited (ICVL).18 Likewise, resettlement of near mine
communities at the Las Bambas Copper Project in the Apurimac
region of southern Peru has also experienced delays, in part due to
changes in corporate ownership from Swiss mining conglomerate
Glencore-Xstrata to Chinese-owned MMG across 2013 and 2014. A
‘relocation agreement’ negotiated with the Fuerabamba commu-
nity in 2010 by the previous owners is now contested. Following
numerous protests, the community has refused to move to the
town of Nueva Cuidad De Fuerabamba, citing water contamination17 Downing argues that this strategy “favours the Company's interest, spreads the
investment costs for land acquisition throughout the lifespan of the mine, and al-
lows the company to justify a forced displacement in the interest of public safety
and health, a resolution to a problem that the mine created in the ﬁrst place” (p.9).
As of 2014, La Granja's proposed development pathway was gradual, commencing
with a smaller ‘starter mine’, with expansions phased over an estimated 30 years.
18 ICVL is a joint venture company incorporated in India and set up by the
mandate of the Government of India exclusively for the purpose of the acquisition
of coal mines and coal assets in overseas territories.as primary concerns. It is the volatility of the mining sector, and the
frequency at which projects are suspended, acquired or abandoned
and the effects on resettlement that we highlight here.
The brownﬁeld effect can exacerbate conﬂict and create a hot-
bed of opposition, not only between company and community, but
also within communities who were resettled. Communities reset-
tled a few years apart, for example, may have sold land for very
different prices; the ﬁrst when the community did not have a sense
of land values relative to industrial scale mining, and the second
with the beneﬁt of hindsight informed by a strong sense of impacts.
Dams, construction project agri-business, forestry and even oil and
gas can more readily plan resettlement as a fronteend activity.
These industries work within a development envelope where the
geographic impact can be more clearly deﬁned. In these industries,
there is no project ‘tail’ that is dependent on future discoveries,
volatile commodity prices and a complex set of interactions and
dependencies.
4.2. Cohabitation and proximity to production
With MIDR, it is the pattern of cohabitation arrangements be-
tween mines and resettled communities that have become a
deﬁning feature. Communities will often reside in close proximity
to production, where land acquired by the project remains visible
to relocated households. Some communities will bear witness to
dramatic landscape change from within the mining lease itself.
Shared occupancy of mine lease areas adds further complexity to
mine-community relations, a complexity that is intensiﬁed when
communities are relocated within the mining lease.
Other projects relocate communities to areas adjacent to the
mine. One example is the Lihir mine in the New Ireland Province of
Papua New Guinea (PNG). In 1995, the company formally negoti-
ated development agreements with landowner residents;
including two sub-agreements for the relocation of Put Put/Lado-
lam and Kapit villagers whowere residing on themining lease area
(Filer, 2000). One village community, Putput, was relocated off the
mining lease to nearby customary land where residents had clan
afﬁliations in the hope that they could “retain a semblance of
village unity” (Bainton, 2010, p. 32). Since 1995 the plant site has
expanded within the lease area and the buffer zone within the
lease has been utilised for infrastructure. At the same time, the
community has moved closer to the mine perimeter due to land
pressures and population increases. Today, the distance between
the project and the community has narrowed to a fence line
(Fig. 1).
A number of factors drive co-habitation. Firstly, identifying and
acquiring land that is suitable for resettling people is difﬁcult. For a
multitude of reasons, communities in nearby areas may not be in a
position or necessarily want to make land available for a resettle-
ment. Moreover, governments may not approve of the settlement,
and lands may be insufﬁcient to support both the residential and
livelihood needs of settlers. Secondly, maintaining close proximity
to the mining operation can have perceived advantages for some
families and individuals in terms of recruitment, services and
business opportunities. While communities living close to themine
may be more exposed to social and environmental impacts, they
may be unwilling to move away if doing so reduces their access to
project beneﬁts (Bainton and Mcintryre, 2013).
This ‘proximity to production’ differentiates mining from other
sectors, such as in the case of dams, where the original site is
submergede covered in a relatively unproductive and benign state.
Where resettled communities are proximate to lands that are
potentially productive, but have been quarantined for use by the
mine, the potential for conﬂict increases. The cohabitation at the
Prestea gold mine in Western Ghana provides a helpful example.
Fig. 1. Putput relocation, Lihir Island, New Ireland Province, PNG.
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company-community conﬂict is based on land that the company
has not put to productive use (and would not relinquish) but which
is of value to local small scale miners (galamsey).19 A failed reset-
tlement and compensation agreement between the company and
locals exacerbated tensions (ibid).20 Likewise, the combination of
small scale or informal mining and resettlement in proximate
communities has generated exceptionally difﬁcult circumstances at
sites such as the Porgeramine in the Enga Province of PNG and Gold
Ridge on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands; circumstances that
have resulted in the steady erosion of law and order, human rights
investigations, work stoppages and multiple fatalities
(Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012).21
Aside from mining, there are few large-scale industries that are
capable of simultaneously creating the basis for displacement and
the grounds for resettlement avoidance. Current international
standards emphasise the need to ‘avoid’ resettlement. For this
reason, the emphasis on avoidance rather than minimising the
impact of resettlement becomes highly problematic in the context
of mining. Simply because most resettlements turn out poorly does
not mean that avoidance should be taken as a default position.
Companies that have avoided resettlement due to compliance and
cost concerns have in some instances created environments
whereby the project and the community are sharing core infra-
structure (such as haul roads), and where the outright reluctance to19 Debate over competing land use between mining and agriculture is wide-
spread. For example see Mkuzi et al. (2013); Schueler et al. (2011); Mishra and
Pujari (2008) and Oliver-Smith (2011).
20 It is worth noting that in the Prestea case, Golden Star Resources has not
resettled the people of Prestea, or part thereof.
21 According to Gilthorpe and Banks (2012, pg192), the level of social complexity
at Porgera was “simply too much to be contained within the ﬁnancial and logistical
bounds of such a rational planning exercise”. They add that “The complexity and
evolution of the local community, in other words, was more than a match for the
World Bank's best planning frameworks”. For an ethnographic history of the
Yakabari Waste Dump resettlement event at Porgera, see Golub's Leviathans at the
Gold Mine: Creating Indigenous and Corporate Actors in Papua New Guinea (2014, p.
24e73).physically relocate people has resulted in communities incorpo-
rating unacceptable safety and health risks into daily life, even in
circumstances where communities explicitly request to be moved.
Without strict governance measures in place, mining projects
have the potential to encroach upon the life, land and livelihood of
host communities. Recent studies undertaken of the giant Minera
Yanacocha complex in northern Peru, for example, highlight issues
of encroachment by the mine and their cumulative effects on
everyday life. Company-commissioned studies have documented
distinct patterns of protest stemming from MIDR and the pro-
gressive encroachment of the project into near mine communities
(Kemp et al., 2013; Elizalde, 2009). Any avoidance decision must be
set against the net impacts that a community will experience if
resettlement is not at least offered on the basis of future mine-
community cohabitation scenarios. The challenge here is that
some companies claiming compliance with international standards
by virtue of having ‘avoided’ resettlement in the design phase may
also be avoiding the cost of land acquisition, resettlement and
impact mitigation efforts. In these circumstances, the cumulative
impact of avoidance may not, in fact, provide any safeguards for
local communities in the context of mining.
4.3. Inter-dependency
As stated above, relocatees' lives can become entangled with the
mine and its activities. Reﬂecting the cohabitation/proximity
model, one set of entanglements relates to the dynamic interaction
between impact patterns, mitigation measures and the ﬂow and
distribution of local-level beneﬁts. The delicate balance struck be-
tween interventions designed to soften the impact of resettlement
and the residual effects experienced by resettled communities,
forms the basis of this entanglement. At Yanacocha the residual
effects of displacement continue to drive company-community
conﬂict. Bebbington et al. (2008, p. 2895) maintain that the
mine's early land acquisition program “triggered the ﬁrst rumblings
of discontent with the mine”. They link drivers of discontent to
conditions under which land was acquired, with accusations of
forced sales and inﬂationary pressures in the local land market.
Fig. 2. Cost comparison of MIDR by project stage based on USD per household.
22 These costs reﬂect both what is ‘planned’ at the time the RAP is ﬁnalized and
what the company is prepared to disclose to either direct stakeholders or the wider
public. Actual costs tend to far exceed planned spend.
23 The data presented in this article should be read as providing an indication of
trends across the sector. For the reasons stated above, the data gleaned from RAPs
should be treated as aspirational. The authors have also collected data on de-
mographics and project costs from newspaper articles and public reports; which
are themselves based on a combination of data sources of varying reliability.
Moreover, reporting on the number of persons displaced by projects varies
considerably; in some instances data refers to individuals, in others households are
used. For our purposes we have used ‘households’ as the basis of analysis, given that
in most cases it is the household that forms the basic ‘compensable unit’. To arrive
at a household ﬁgure, the authors have assumed the average household size for the
affected area in question. The lack of accurate and comparable data are further
cause for improved data collection and research in this area. Comparisons based on
cost per hectare of land yield similar results.
24 In jurisdictions where land cannot be owned, sold or purchased outright, this
dynamic may not affect land prices.
J.R. Owen, D. Kemp / Journal of Cleaner Production 87 (2015) 478e488484Although Yanacocha's approach to land acquisition changed over
time, including the establishment of a Former Landowners Pro-
gram, new issues emerged as the mine continued its program of
incremental expansion (Whellams, 2007).
Economic entanglement between mines and communities is a
well-documented phenomenon (Ballard and Banks, 2003).
Household level dependency obviously grows when people are
displaced. Dependency can also manifest at a community or sub-
national level where there is a lack of economic diversity, capac-
ity or investment in sustainable livelihoods. Entanglement also
occurs where expectations for social development prompt com-
panies tomediate state-community relationships. Companies act as
a proxy for the state by providing services and infrastructure for
resettled or receiving communities where governments either
cannot or will not deliver. These contributions can diffuse tension
and ensure access to land for mining activities in the short term, at
the same time planting the seeds of future conﬂict when companies
wind back their assistance, or fail to meet expectations. While the
state can lean on companies to deliver essential services, so too can
companies lean on the authority of the state to expedite negotia-
tions over land access, or manage law and order or local conﬂict in a
contentious resettlement scenario.
Whether resettled communities ‘accept’ an entanglement
arrangement is often determined bywhether their expectations are
being met. Communities are dependent on companies upholding
their part of the resettlement ‘bargain’. What often transpires,
however, is that companies commit to more than they are willing,
or able, to service in the long term e not necessarily because they
do not have the resources, but because priorities and personnel
change over time. Staff who hold an understanding of the reset-
tlement process are not always present in the latter stages of mine
life to conﬁrm or validate the nature of original commitments. A
cycle of (re)negotiation can escalate into tension, disruption, or
violent protest. Companies routinely develop relationship ‘binds’
with resettled communities where production is contingent on
approval from the resettlement community. These inter-dependent
relationships tend not to happen with other infrastructure -related
developments, such as dam or road construction projects, as they
are more one-off resettlements where the negotiation cycle occurs
only once.
Finally, resettled communities are often beholden to the ﬁnan-
cial success (or otherwise) of a mining operation, and in some cases
the parent company. Allocations for community investment, live-
lihood programs and even community engagement programs are
fundamentally budget dependent. Operating budgets are typically
determined annually, underpinned by the commodity cycle, rather
than local-level vulnerabilities. Neither are budgets always deter-
mined by the proﬁtability of a single mine. Proﬁtable mines with
resettlement obligations in large companies can have their proﬁts
re-directed to support other projects within a corporate portfolio,
such as those under development, or in debt. Expansions, acquisi-
tions, closures and divestments can also affect the availability of
revenue and resources to support resettlement and livelihood
programs. In the absence of resources, competition between in-
dividuals, households, families and communities e including be-
tween relocatees and receiving or neighbouring communitiese can
place people at further risk of disruption and dislocation.
4.4. Leveraging and cost increase
Capital outlay for most planned resettlements includes studies
and surveys, engagement and consultation, specialist consul-
tancies and services, permitting and legal fees, site preparation,
housing and public amenity, road, water and electricity, and social
and community development, together with compensation forloss of land, assets and opportunities. Our data suggests a general
pattern whereby total cost of planned resettlement tends to in-
crease as mines move through the project lifecycle. A review of the
14 publically and privately held RAPs from the MIDR database
indicates that planned resettlement costs in the operation phase
are signiﬁcantly higher than those incurred at construction.22 To
establish a basis for comparison, the total disclosed budget was
divided by the total number of displaced households so as to arrive
at a ‘per household’ cost for each project.23 A median cost was
calculated for resettlements undertaken at construction (N ¼ 8)
and at operation (N ¼ 6). The results suggest that if compared on a
per household basis, resettlements staged at the operational cycle
of a project can be two-thirds higher than those at earlier phases
(see Fig. 2).
There are explanations for this pattern. First, during early pha-
ses, companies purchase land at a time where there is a generally
lower level of competition for land. As the company acquires land in
the area, the market for land becomesmore competitive, driving up
land prices (Sonter et al., 2014b, p.70).24 Second, land prices in the
early period of construction do not reﬂect industrial rates for land.
In later phases, relocatees are more aware of the value of landwhen
converted to industrial use and the cash value of re-entering the
market as buyers under these new circumstances. Third, relocatees
at the operational phase have greater exposure to market processes
than their peers had at construction, including corporate pur-
chasing power, negotiating tactics and operational vulnerabilities.
This can put them in a stronger bargaining position. Finally, in the
early phases, there are fewer legacy or compensation precedents
for parties to lean on in negotiations. These factors, coupled with
the general inﬂationary effect associated with the mine's presence,
including for housing, consumables and utilities, are likely to push
the cost of a relocation program upwards.
A key determinant that is often overlooked in resettlement
planning is the inﬂuence of ‘leveraging’. Leveraging is another
major driver of planned and unplanned costs and takes place both
inside and outside the organisation. Companies are most familiar
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themselves to negotiate higher rates of compensation for land and
assets in exchange for operational access. Leveraging occurs for a
range of reasons. Some forms of leveraging can be interpreted as
purely opportunistic, where relocatees demand exorbitant prices in
the hope that the company simply pays out. In instances when
inﬂated payments are agreed to by the company for the purposes of
securing land access, a precedent is set for future negotiations.
Other times leveraging can be read as a proxy for deep-seated
grievance, which in some cases can have its origins elsewhere.
Project planning and internal leveraging; that is, between organ-
isational units, is less well documented.
During the planning phase, developers have an opportunity to
deﬁne cost elements of a resettlement project to ensure imple-
mentation is fully resourced. In order to accurately deﬁne capital
expenditure, social specialists need to actively participate in plan-
ning and forecasting processes, characterising potential issues and
pressures on the project. Our direct engagement with the nine ﬁeld
sites suggests that social functions are not generally well integrated
into strategic forward planning for new projects, expansions or
major capital works. The under-budgeting for MIDR that occurs in
the planning phase in part reﬂects the exclusion of social special-
ists. During ﬁeldwork, several project managers explained that
social specialists do not always apply tools and formulas that enable
accurate cost modelling. These deﬁciencies exacerbate the indus-
try's tendency to routinely under-estimate budgets for MIDR. This
tendency, combined with the sparse body of knowledge onMIDR to
inform modelling and forecasting, readily leads to cost blow-outs,
under performance and exacerbation of conﬂict. Neglecting com-
munity concerns creates ﬁnancial risks that can far outweigh
costs.25
The most effective lever for social specialists to secure human
and ﬁnancial resources for resettlement implementation is external
pressure. Crisis scenarios, particularly those that put production at
risk, remain the most effective internal lever (Kemp and Owen,
2013). Our ﬁeldwork conﬁrms the relationship between poor
project planning and the ad-hoc practices of managing social and
project risk in resettlement. In each of the nine ﬁeld sites, inaccu-
rate forecasts and inadequate capital allocation at the project
planning stage, combined with poor responsiveness to ad-hoc is-
sues, resulted in companies servicing resettlement challenges on
short cycle budgets, typically using operational expenditure (OPEX)
or corporate contingency budgets, rather than incorporating costs
into capital expenditure (CAPEX). When companies fall into this
pattern, the case for resourcing depends on communities escalating
concerns through conﬂict or by compromising company access to
land.4.5. Governance by default
Governance arrangements for MIDR differ from other sectors.
The range of actors is similar: developers, governments and their
respective agents; affected and resettlement communities and
their representatives; non-government organisations and other
civil society groups. The main point of departure from arrange-
ments in other sectors lies in the complexity of factors as outlined
above, where the boundaries of responsibility between these
parties and the allocation of resources is more ﬂuid and opaque. In25 The meeting summary from a Chatham House forum on community relations
in extractive industries, quotes one speaker as stating that “cost ratios on the old
adage ‘prevention is better than cure’ can sometimes be as high as ten to one”.
Others agreed and noted that the cost ratio may be even higher (Chatham House,
2013 p 4).frontier mining locations, the resources available to global com-
panies typically outstrip those available to the state and other ac-
tors. Resourcing can therefore quickly default to the company, and
along with it, responsibility for planning and implementation.26
Most jurisdictions involve governments delegating re-
sponsibility for managing resettlement to mining companies as a
permitting condition. For other large-scale development projects
such as dams and major infrastructure, the state either leads the
resettlement process, or takes a prominent role in public consul-
tations. In mining, it is often the company that inherits exclusive
responsibility for RAP formulation and implementation, with gov-
ernments requiring companies to serve as their proxy in the de-
livery of sub-elements of a RAP. These elements can include
provision for speciﬁc infrastructure, services, welfare support or
other ‘packages’ for eligible households such as agricultural
extension programs and local economic development. Interviews
undertaken with management personnel suggest that companies
are reluctant to substitute for governments in this way.
There exist a small number of countries where MIDR is gov-
ernment managed. This does not automatically translate into host
governments accepting full responsibility for the planning, relo-
cation, or livelihood restoration and improvement for MIDR events
in their jurisdiction. Speciﬁc sub-tasks may rest with the state but
remain project ﬁnanced. In other cases, MIDR will be government
managed, but strategically positioned outside of the project
development envelope. For example, at LXML's Sepon mine of the
Savanakhet Province in Lao PDR, the district government has un-
dertaken several ‘village consolidation’ activities throughout the
life of mine, moving villages away from high impact areas and co-
locating them with pre-existing villages outside of the known
impact area. This process is represented as an effort by the district
level government to improve administration by concentrating the
population closer to service and infrastructure hubs. By de-
populating land that is of interest to the mine, the government
assisted the company in avoiding responsibility for MIDR. Similar
efforts to ‘consolidate’ villages have occurred at the Thach Khe Iron
Ore Mine in the Ha Tinh Province of Vietnam (Vo, 2014). In these
and other cases, companies are left to manage resettlement leg-
acies, often with minimal input from the state. Subsequent village
consolidations occasioned during project expansions become
highly problematic once the underlying purpose becomes clear to
the affected population.
Project-led resettlements, or the agreed or inherited elements
that are led by projects, are usually co-ordinated by the community
relations function at the operational level. As noted elsewhere, this
function is routinely peripheral to ‘core’ mining decisions (Kemp
and Owen, 2013). This internal allocation of responsibilities cre-
ates a situationwhere those company agents who are closest to the
needs, aspirations and concerns of resettlement communities are
not always included in major planning decisions. Some companies
are working to address this issue, such as Anglo American's
corporate-level Resettlement Committee, which has internal au-
thority to oversee major resettlements. Whether these pattern-
breaking initiatives are being replicated elsewhere in the in-
dustry, and whether their form, function and position within the
organisation is proving inﬂuential from a governance perspective is
not yet known.
While developers and governments have direct responsibility
for implementation of MIDR, these events can attract other
important stakeholders with speciﬁc interest and inﬂuence over
governance aspects. Lenders and insurers who subscribe to26 This shifting of responsibility often takes place in the absence of a clear legal
framework for MIDR with adequate safeguards for project-affected people.
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often inﬂuential in the context of the lender-client relationship.
Lenders rely on routine monitoring and auditing to achieve assur-
ance that their investments are not subject to unacceptable risk,
including reputational and social risks associated with poor reset-
tlement practice. Audit methodologies do, however, have signiﬁ-
cant limitations in terms of driving social performance
improvement (Kemp et al., 2012). In new mining frontiers where
oversight of MIDR also rests with the state, gaps in capacity, re-
sources and knowledge ofMIDRweaken governance arrangements.
Under these circumstances, civil society actors have readily
emerged. When the state fails to provide a strong regulatory
framework and adequate oversight, these types of agencies are
quick to identify governance gaps. Likewise, when the state is
present but fails to exhibit independence, non-government orga-
nisations can step in to ﬁll what they see as an accountability
vacuum. This action is often misunderstood by mining companies
and states as being anti-mining, but this is not always the case.
5. Implications for policy and practice
Our aim in this article has been to highlight the particular di-
mensions of mining that affect resettlement. Despite the general
lack of literature that addresses certain aspects of MIDR, we
maintain that there are distinct features that warrant dedicated
attention and research. The primary source of distinction is both
the existence and high proportion of brownﬁeld resettlement
events. When considering the high incidence of brownﬁeld reset-
tlements alongside the industry's aspirations for improved social
performance, the signiﬁcance of developing an improved under-
standing of MIDR moves clearly into frame. In this section we
discuss three pertinent issues: stakeholder approval, transparency
and knowledge building, and the positioning of MIDR within
contemporary policy debates.
5.1. Permitting and stakeholder approval
Uncertainty is a central feature of brownﬁeld MIDR events. This
can be demonstrated using the contemporary FPIC debate and the
question of ‘consent’ (Owen and Kemp, 2014). It is widely presumed
that community consent can only be achieved under circumstances
of full disclosure and protection of the ‘right to know’. Providing
information to communities that may not have experiencedmining
or any major development for that matter, poses a signiﬁcant
challenge. Levels of uncertainty intensify where developers are not
in a position to disclose impacts because they are not yet known or
have not been modelled. If a developer was to disclose its full range
of expansion options and associated resettlement scenarios from
the concept or pre-feasibility phase, the burden of uncertainty
would shift from company to community. International safeguards
encourage disclosure, but do not provide guidance on how to
manage the uncertainty caused by full disclosure.
The level of disclosure provided at permitting has serious im-
plications for both the regulator and for stakeholders who have
signalled support for the project. Brownﬁelds resettlements can
take place several years after a project has received its initial per-
mits. For governments, the implication is that projects are
approved without a comprehensive understanding of the full
extent of social impacts or a plan for how those impacts will be
managed or mitigated by the proponent. For communities, MIDR is
a major source of disruption and impact; it is therefore difﬁcult to
understand how consent could ever be regarded as ‘informed’
when signiﬁcant impacts that will invariably change the shape and
function of community life were not clear at project start-up.
Ensuring adequate levels of disclosure without shifting theburden of uncertainty to the community to manage alone requires
careful exploration of different mine plan scenarios during initial
approval so that communities can evaluate the risks of proceeding.
5.2. Transparency and knowledge building
As an arena characterised by social risk, conﬂict and innumer-
able practice challenges, it is indefensible that MIDR has been
overlooked as an industry agenda. MIDR is not merely lacking in
terms of its prominence in industry thinking and policy; individual
companies lack the internal capacity to properly service the
different dimensions of a resettlement. This internal capacity gap
grows when complex issues relating to legacy, traditional forms of
land ownership, multiple resettlements, and changed ownership
are part of the equation.
To improve understanding in this domain of practice, access to
the company sphere is critical. Without access to decision makers,
decision making and planning processes, historical records and live
events, researchers, educators and practitioners will be unable to
generate the type of knowledge resources required to support
professional improvements. At this point in time, access to reliable
and comparable sets of data is a major barrier to the development
of such resources and opportunities. The reluctance to share data
on MIDR case studies can be so strong that company personnel
often do not share informationwithin their own organisations. The
foundations for sector-wide knowledge building and guidance
need serious attention if there is to be any measureable change in
performance.
5.3. Connecting to contemporary debates
We have drawn attention to a disconnect between MIDR and
contemporary debates within industry. In social policy terms, this
means that advances in key domains of practice are not driving
improvements in the industry's approach to MIDR. A reciprocal
effect is that major practice dilemmas like MIDR do not inform or
test the building of policy positions in related areas. We have used
‘FPIC’ and ‘agreements’ to illustrate the point; yet the same issue
could be raised in relation to ‘development contribution’, ‘eco-
nomic empowerment’, ‘grievance mechanisms’ or universal ‘hu-
man rights’.
These disconnects are manifold. The most obvious and most
concerning is the level of priority given to MIDR in contemporary
policy debates. There is also a lack of connection between industry
practice and learnings from DIDR. While we have insisted on the
importance of creating distinctions between MIDR and DIDR, core
terminology and concepts relating to ‘dispossession’, ‘eligibility’,
‘disarticulation’, ‘entitlement’ and ‘reconstruction’ (Cernea, 1997,
2000; Oliver-Smith, 2009) are fundamental, but do not feature in
industry MIDR vernacular. Non-engagement in related and alter-
native discourse will maintain the industry's insular perspective on
this topic, and promulgate the privatisation of MIDR knowledge.
6. Conclusion
This article highlights key aspects of the status and workings of
MIDR as a global practice. We have drawn attention to MIDR as a
distinctly brownﬁeld phenomenon, due in large part to the high
proportion of resettlement events that occur during the operational
phase of the mine lifecycle. There are a number of factors that
characterise what we call the ‘brownﬁeld effect’. These include
incremental expansion and cost deferral, cohabitation, interde-
pendency and leveraging. Our data suggests a clear pattern of
exponential cost increase for MIDR on a per household basis from
construction to operations.
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developers and governments shifting the burden of uncertainty to
communities in jurisdictions with weak regulatory frameworks.
Additionally, and in a perverse application of the safeguard stan-
dards, some mining companies will claim to be in compliance with
safeguard standards and contain costs by ‘avoiding’ resettlement.
This result can be achieved for companies by proceeding with an
expansion strategy that relies on external drivers to trigger or
‘force’ resettlement. The brownﬁeld reading of incremental land
take in mining prompts a distinctly different interpretation to the
application of ‘force’ in resettlement events. There is an urgent need
to understand those drivers that compel mining companies to
design projects for minimal impact, address the long-term and
cumulative impacts of displacement on affected peoples and to give
practical effect to ‘resettlement with development’ by linking MIDR
with other emerging domains of industry policy and practice.
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